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21 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence
Director of Economic Research ✓
Director of Strategic Research
Director, Basic and Geographic
Intelligence
Chief, Information Requirements
Staff

SUBJECT : PNIO's

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1. [REDACTED] has proposed the attached redraft of DCID 1/3. In it he has attempted to limit the PNIO's as strictly as possible to questions of national survival. This is quite frankly intended to emasculate them, or at least to make sure they cannot be used as they are today to justify all kinds of superfluous intelligence activity. The question of a Supplement (Forward, para 4) and its relationship to the CIRL is reserved for later discussion.

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2. [REDACTED] committee, on which I represent the DDI, is to meet again next week to discuss this draft. Please give me any comments you have by noon Tuesday, 26 December.

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[REDACTED]
Deputy Director of Current Intelligence

Attachment: a/s

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/3

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

(Revised)

FOREWORD

1. NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3 requires that a Director of Central Intelligence Directive provide "identification from time to time, and on a current basis, of Priority National Intelligence Objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects," which are to be issued for "general intelligence guidance."

The following list is established pursuant to that requirement and replaces that contained in DCID No. 1/3, dated 1 July 1966, which is hereby rescinded.

2. Most of the intelligence required for the formulation and execution of national security policy is produced in response to the Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives similarly prescribed by NSCID No. 1 and contained in DCID No. 1/2. But beyond that general catalogue, which suffices for most subjects of intelligence interest, it is necessary to establish "specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence

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and for collection and other activities in support thereof."

At the same time it is essential to avoid a listing of priorities which is either so voluminous or so general as to encourage a wasteful diffusion of effort.

3. Accordingly, the Priority National Intelligence Objectives are hereby defined as those fundamental questions affecting national survival, which taken together constitute the most critical long-range substantive problems confronting the intelligence community as a whole. Because they do not change drastically from year to year, these questions will for planning purposes be considered valid for the next several years, but will be reviewed from time to time on the motion of any member of the United States Intelligence Board.

4. It is possible, however, to identify in advance some of the other important questions which will be of unusual intelligence interest during the next year, but which are of a more local or transitory character than those defined as affecting national survival. Such questions will be contained in a separate supplement to this Directive which will be revised semi-annually or upon motion of any member of the USIB. It is the intent of the USIB to keep this supplemental list short and specific, in order to concentrate maximum attention upon the few subjects which are most important at any one time.

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OBJECTIVES

A. Questions Affecting National Survival

1. Maximum prior warning of impending military attack on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is committed to defend.

2. Major changes in the personnel, objectives, and intentions of the leadership of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

3. The strategic military forces of the Soviet Union: their capabilities, current and prospective deployment, and Soviet intentions with regard to their development and employment, with particular emphasis on major changes respecting nuclear weapons, the vehicles developed for their delivery, and Soviet strategic defenses.

4. Nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems of the Chinese Communists.

5. Major changes in the international alignments or internal political and economic stability of the principal powers.

B. Other Questions of Unusual Current Interest (See Supplement.)

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